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___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Before the Court is an application by Hess Oil Virgin
Islands Corporation (“HOVIC”) for an extension of time to
file a petition for a writ of certiorari from a decision of the
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. Our rules provide that
an extension of the sixty-day period in which to file a
certiorari petition may be granted “for good cause shown.”
3d Cir. Local Appellate Rule (“LAR”) 112.4(a) (2010).
HOVIC seeks an additional thirty days to file its petition on
the ground that it recently retained counsel to represent it
before this Court, and counsel contends that he cannot meet
the current deadline, mainly due to other professional
commitments. For the reasons explained below, I conclude
that HOVIC’s grounds for seeking an extension of time do
not amount to “good cause.” However, because this court has
not previously addressed standards applicable to the showing
required under LAR 112.4(a), I will grant HOVIC’s request
for an extension of time.
I.
I need not recount the nature of the dispute between
HOVIC and the respondent, Pierre P. Joseph, for purposes of
addressing this extension request. Briefly stated, HOVIC
intends to file a certiorari petition from a decision of the
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands entered March 8, 2011.
3

The Supreme Court reversed an order in which the Superior
Court of the Virgin Islands granted summary judgment in
HOVIC’s favor, and it remanded to the Superior Court for
further proceedings. According to HOVIC, the parties agreed
to settle the case shortly before the Supreme Court issued its
March 8 decision. HOVIC moved to recall the mandate or
for leave to file a petition for rehearing out of time, citing the
purported settlement. The Supreme Court denied both
requests. HOVIC maintains that the case became moot once
the parties agreed to settle, and it intends to seek certiorari to
argue, inter alia, that mootness deprived the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction to issue the March 8 decision.
A petitioner may seek review in this Court “of a final
decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands … by
filing a petition for a writ of certiorari … within 60 days from
the entry of judgment sought to be reviewed[.]” LAR
112.2(a) (emphasis added); see also Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r
of Labor, 613 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Under 48 U.S.C. §
1613, the Third Circuit has temporary certiorari jurisdiction
over final decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.”).
For purposes of adjudicating the present motion, I will
assume that the March 8 decision is a “final decision,” and
therefore one that would fall within the scope of this Court’s
jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1613 if a timely certiorari
petition were filed. As such, HOVIC’s sixty-day period to
file a certiorari petition in this matter expired on Monday,
May 9, 2011.1 HOVIC filed its application for an extension
1

The sixtieth day actually fell on May 7, 2011, which was a
Saturday. While our local rules do not specify a method for
computing the last day for filing a petition for a writ of
4

of time on May 3, six days prior to the due date. HOVIC asks
for an extension of thirty days, until June 8.2
HOVIC contends that it needs more time because it
retained appellate counsel “to advise it of its procedural
options and to represent it before this Court only a few weeks
ago.”3 Appellate counsel notes that the Supreme Court
certiorari, “[t]he Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the
extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory
provisions or these [local] rules, may be applied to a
proceeding seeking a writ of certiorari.” LAR 112.14(a).
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(a) governs the
computation of “any time period specified … in any local rule
… that does not specify a method of computing time.” Rule
26(a) is not inconsistent with LAR 112.2(a) and applies here.
“When the period is stated in days … include the last day of
the period, but if the last day of the period is a Saturday, …
the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is
not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” Fed. R. App. P.
26(a)(1)(C). Accordingly, HOVIC’s last day on which to file
a certiorari petition was Monday, May 9, 2011.
2

HOVIC subsequently submitted its proposed certiorari
petition for filing on June 8, and our Clerk entered an order
holding the petition in abeyance pending disposition of the
application for an extension of time.

3

HOVIC was represented before the Supreme Court of the
Virgin Islands by counsel based in St. Croix. That same
counsel is listed on the application for an extension of time,
along with HOVIC’s recently added appellate counsel, Peter
5

denied the motion to recall the mandate on April 28, 2011,
and “the analysis contained in that order must be addressed in
any petition that is to be filed.” Finally, appellate counsel
asserts that he had competing obligations prior to the due date
for HOVIC’s certiorari petition, including the filing of a
petition for rehearing and an extension request in other cases.
In addition, on the Thursday and Friday before the Monday
on which the certiorari petition was due, counsel had
commitments to the Third Circuit Bar Association and Third
Circuit Judicial Conference, including an appearance as a
panelist at a Judicial Conference meeting.
II.
Congress has provided that, for the first fifteen years
following establishment of the Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals “shall have
jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari all final decisions
of the highest court of the Virgin Islands from which a
decision could be had.” 48 U.S.C. § 1613. Congress also has
conferred upon this Court “jurisdiction to promulgate rules
necessary to carry out the provisions of [§ 1613].” Id.
Consistent with this mandate, we adopted local rules in 2007
to govern practice and procedure in the exercise of our
certiorari jurisdiction.4 See LARs 112.1-14. Among other
Goldberger, Esq. Mr. Goldberger’s signature appears on the
extension application.
4
The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands was established
in 2004, see Pichardo, 613 F.3d at 94, and “officially assumed
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the Superior Court on
January 29, 2007.” Hypolite v. People, 51 V.I. 97, 101 (V.I.
6

things, we established a sixty-day deadline to file a certiorari
petition, LAR 112.2(a), and made allowance for a petitioner
to seek additional time. Our local rule regarding extensions
of time to file a certiorari petition provides as follows:
A circuit judge, for good cause shown, may
extend the time for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari or cross-petition for a period not
exceeding 30 days.
Any application for
extension of time within which to file a petition
for writ of certiorari must set out the grounds on
which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked,
must identify the judgment sought to be
reviewed and have appended thereto a copy of
the opinion, and must set forth with specificity
the reasons justifying an extension.
An
untimely petition for writ of certiorari must be
accompanied by a motion for extension of time.
However, an application for extension of time
to file a petition for certiorari ordinarily will not
be granted, if filed less than 5 days before the
expiration of the time to file a petition.
LAR 112.4(a).
This court has not, in a precedential decision,
addressed the showing required to establish “good cause” for
an extension of time to file a certiorari petition.5 Because
2009).
5
I am satisfied that HOVIC’s application complies with the
remaining requirements of LAR 112.4(a). HOVIC has
7

“good cause” is undefined in LAR 112.4(a), my undertaking
here is to give meaning to the term. I begin, as I must, by
looking to the plain language of the rule. See, e.g., In re Lord
Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir.
2009).
“Good cause” is understood to mean “[a] legally
sufficient reason,” and it reflects “the burden placed on a
litigant (usu. by court rule or order) to show why a request
should be granted or an action excused.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 251 (9th ed. 2009). Of course, a proffered reason
appended a copy of the opinion sought to be reviewed and set
forth with adequate specificity the reasons why it believes an
extension of time should be granted. In addition, HOVIC has
“set out the grounds on which the jurisdiction of this court is
invoked.” LAR 112.4(a). As mentioned earlier in the text,
there is an issue as to whether the Supreme Court’s March 8
decision is “final” and reviewable at this time. Nevertheless,
I do not construe LAR 112.4(a) to require a fully developed
argument on finality in support of an application for an
extension of time. HOVIC’s invocation of our jurisdiction
under § 1613, and its expression of an intent to present
argument in the certiorari petition on whether the March 8
decision meets the finality requirement, are enough to satisfy
LAR 112.4(a). In the certiorari petition itself, a petitioner is
required to present a complete argument regarding this
Court’s jurisdiction, including “a concise statement of the
ground on which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked, with
citations to applicable statutes and stating relevant facts
establishing the finality of the order.” LAR 112.6(a)(3).
8

or “cause” that may be legally sufficient in one context may
not be so in another. Federal practice is replete with rules that
require a moving party to show “good cause,”6 but
6

See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“[I]f the plaintiff shows
good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for
service for an appropriate period.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)
(providing, with certain exceptions, that “[w]hen an act may
or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for
good cause, extend the time”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (a
scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and
with the judge’s consent”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“For
good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.”); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(c) (court may set aside an entry of default “for
good cause”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2) (temporary restraining
order “expires at the time after entry -- not to exceed 14 days
-- that the court sets, unless before that time the court, for
good cause, extends it for a like period or the adverse party
consents to a longer extension.”); Fed. R. App. P. 2 (“On its
own or a party’s motion, a court of appeals may—to expedite
its decision or for other good cause—suspend any provision
of these rules in a particular case and order proceedings as it
directs, except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).”); Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(5)(A) (allowing district court to extend time to
file notice of appeal if moving party “shows excusable
neglect or good cause”); Fed. R. App. P. 26(b) (providing,
with certain exceptions, that “[f]or good cause, the court may
extend the time prescribed by these rules or by its order to
perform any act, or may permit an act to be done after that
time expires”).
9

determining whether the showing made will justify granting
the relief sought can be accomplished only by considering the
specific nature and purpose of the rule at issue. See, e.g.,
Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
that “there is good cause [for a protective order under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26] when a party shows that disclosure will result in a
clearly defined, specific and serious injury but that broad
allegations of harm are not sufficient to establish good
cause”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71
F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that good cause to
excuse late service under former Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j) “requires
a demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking
an enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance
within the time specified in the rules,” and “absence of
prejudice alone can never constitute good cause”) (quotation
marks omitted). In short, the term “good cause” itself does
not define the precise showing that we should require in the
particular context of a party seeking more time to file a
petition for a writ of certiorari.
The history behind the adoption of LAR 112.4(a), as
reflected in the Committee Comments to the LARs, does not
shed light on the showing required. It appears that several
provisions in our local rules regarding certiorari review were
modeled after Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Local Circuit
Rule 6-2, which established procedures for that court’s
interim exercise of certiorari jurisdiction over the Supreme
Court of Guam. However, Rule 6-2, which the Ninth Circuit
abrogated in 2005 consistent with the termination of its
certiorari jurisdiction, see 48 U.S.C. § 1424-2 (as amended
Oct. 30, 2004); Santos v. Guam, 436 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th
Cir. 2006), contained no provision for seeking an extension of
10

time to file. See 9th Cir. R. 6-2 (2004). As such, LAR
112.4(a) was not based on a Ninth Circuit rule that provides
meaningful guidance for the present inquiry. And while it
appears that LAR 112.4(a) was modeled after the United
States Supreme Court’s rule on extensions of time, which is
discussed below, the Committee Comments do not expressly
identify a specific source for the rule.7
7

That being said, I conclude that Rule 112.4(a) was
modeled after the Supreme Court’s rule. As originally
drafted and submitted for public comment, Rule 112.4(a),
which was proposed as “Rule 112.2(f),” provided as follows:
A circuit judge, for good cause shown, may
extend the time for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari or cross-petition for a period not
exceeding sixty (60) days. Any application for
extension of time within which to file a petition
for writ of certiorari must set out the grounds on
which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked,
must identify the judgment sought to be
reviewed and have appended thereto a copy of
the opinion, and must set forth with specificity
the reasons justifying an extension.
An
application for extension of time to file a
petition for certiorari must be submitted at least
ten (10) days before the specified final filing
date and will not be granted, except in the most
extraordinary circumstances, if filed less than
ten (10) days before that date.
11

Lacking authority and commentary from this court as
to the intended meaning of “good cause” in LAR 112.4(a), I
must look elsewhere. Fortunately, there are analogues to
draw upon. Courts routinely interpret and apply the goodcause standard under rules that, like LAR 112.4(a), govern
requests for extensions of time to act. I find two such rules
instructive here: (1) the United States Supreme Court’s rule
governing extensions of time to file for certiorari review,
which, as noted, appears to have served as the original model
for LAR 112.4(a); and (2) Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(5)(A), which governs motions to extend the
time to file a notice of appeal.
A.
The current Supreme Court rule regarding extensions
of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari provides in
relevant part as follows:
For good cause, a Justice may extend the time
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari for a
period not exceeding 60 days. An application
to extend the time to file shall set out the basis
for jurisdiction in this Court, identify the
judgment sought to be reviewed, include a copy
of the opinion and any order respecting
rehearing, and set out specific reasons why an
extension of time is justified. The application
must be filed with the Clerk at least 10 days
This language tracked the Supreme Court rule on extensions
of time in most respects.
12

before the date the petition is due, except in
extraordinary circumstances. … An application
to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari is not favored.
Sup. Ct. R. 13(5).
Rule 13(5) requires a showing of “good cause” to
justify extending the time to seek review via certiorari –
precisely what HOVIC must show under LAR 112.4(a).
Thus, the Supreme Court’s treatment of Rule 13(5) is perhaps
our best guide to understanding LAR 112.4(a).
One
difference between these two rules does merit brief
discussion. The Supreme Court states in Rule 13(5) that a
request for an extension of time “is not favored.” In contrast,
LAR 112.4(a) does not express general disfavor for extension
requests, and frowns upon only eleventh-hour requests (i.e.,
requests filed less than five days before the deadline),
explaining that those requests “ordinarily will not be
granted.” As noted, HOVIC’s application was filed more
than five days before its petition was due. Under Rule 13(5),
the Supreme Court would appear to work from the premise
that granting additional time to an applicant like HOVIC is
not favored. I apply no such presumption under LAR
112.4(a). Accordingly, to the extent that this difference in
analytical approach is manifest in the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of “good cause,” I do not intend by my reliance
upon the Supreme Court’s lead to imply disfavor for
extension requests filed in this Court more than five days
before the petition is due. Our rule requires only that such

13

requests be supported by “good cause.”8
Applications under Rule 13(5) are referred to an
individual Justice for determination, and certain Justices have
addressed them in published decisions, either under Rule
13(5) or its predecessors. For example, in Carter v. United
States, 75 S. Ct. 911 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice 1955),
Justice Frankfurter denied an extension of time for failure to
show “real cause,” explaining that “[t]he nature and
substantiality of the point in controversy emerge from the
opinion of the Court of Appeals,” and that “[c]ounsel who
urged the point below is counsel here; the addition of another
counsel hardly affords ground for the desired extension.” Id.
at 911. Further, while acknowledging that, “if counsel are
actively engaged in the trial of a cause during the period
within which a petition for certiorari must be filed, an
appropriate extension of time might be afforded,” id., Justice
Frankfurter observed that, in general, “the responsibility of
counsel to litigation in this Court should take precedence,”
8

There are other differences between Rule 13(5) and LAR
112.4(a). The Supreme Court allows for a maximum sixtyday extension of time (compared to our thirty days), and
requires the filing of an extension request “at least 10 days
before the date the petition is due, except in extraordinary
circumstances.”
These additional distinctions are not
meaningful to the analysis here, which is limited to how the
Supreme Court has applied its good-cause standard, and, by
analogy, the showing that this Court should require when a
petitioner moves for an appropriate extension of time more
than five days before the certiorari petition is due.
14

id., and “the contents of a petition for certiorari seldom call
for the kind of research which may be demanded for a brief
on the merits[.]” Id.
In Kleem v. INS, 479 U.S. 1308 (Scalia, Circuit
Justice 1986), Justice Scalia denied an extension of time for
failure to show good cause, observing that “counsel has given
no reason for his request other than his desire for additional
time to research constitutional issues.” Id. at 1308. Because
“[t]he same reason could be adduced in virtually all cases …
[i]t does not meet the standard of ‘good cause shown’ for the
granting of a disfavored extension.” Id.
In Madden v. Texas, 498 U.S. 1301 (Scalia, Circuit
Justice 1991), Justice Scalia granted three applications for
additional time requested by counsel representing capital
defendants, and denied a fourth application. He found that
“none of these [four] applications, as an original matter,
would meet the standard of ‘good cause shown’ for the
granting of an extension.” Id. at 1304. Justice Scalia rejected
as “unremarkable” the suggestion of one litigant’s counsel
that more time was needed to consult with another lawyer, as
“all petitioners can honestly claim that they would benefit
from additional advice and consultation.” Id. He also
rejected the contention that the withdrawal of appellate
counsel would “automatically justify an extension of time,” as
there was no indication “that the withdrawal was a reasonably
unforeseeable occurrence.” Id. Further, while the “additional
justification” of the death of counsel’s father “would in some
circumstances qualify as ‘good cause shown,’” id., counsel in
question had not been working on the petition and “prevented
by the death from completing his work,” id., and there was
15

“no indication why some other attorney [from the same
office] could not have undertaken this last-minute task, nor
why the task has been left to the last minute.” Id.
Nevertheless, noting that he had not previously set forth his
views on the good-cause standard in his capacity as Circuit
Justice for the Fifth Circuit, Justice Scalia granted thirty-day
extensions in three of the cases, but warned that similar
requests would not be granted in the future. Id. at 1305. He
denied more time in the fourth case on the ground that it
would be improper to extend the period in which to file a
certiorari petition to a date after the petitioner’s established
execution date. Id.
In Mississippi v. Turner, 498 U.S. 1306 (Scalia,
Circuit Justice 1991), Justice Scalia denied the State’s request
for an extension of time, explaining that “counsel’s
overextended caseload is not ‘good cause shown’ unless it is
the result of events unforeseen and uncontrollable by both
counsel and client.” Id. at 1306. He added that, “[l]ike any
other litigant, the State of Mississippi must choose between
hiring more attorneys and taking fewer appeals. Its budget
allocations cannot, and I am sure were not expected to, alter
this Court’s filing requirements.” Id. at 1306-07.
Finally, in Penry v. Texas, 515 U.S. 1304 (Scalia,
Circuit Justice 1995), Justice Scalia found an absence of good
cause where counsel sought more time based on the
voluminous record, the “breadth of errors,” and his absence
from the office during the week before the petition was due.
Id. at 1304. Justice Scalia observed that “all applicants can
honestly claim that they would benefit from additional time to
prepare a petition for certiorari,” id. at 1305-06, and counsel’s
16

“planned absences should affect neither the degree of
preparation afforded a client’s case nor the orderly
administration of our deadlines.” Id. at 1306.
These five decisions, four of which were authored by
the same Justice, represent a limited survey of how the
Supreme Court has disposed of extension requests. Beyond
that, I assume that other Justices have entertained requests for
more time without publishing their views. Nevertheless,
useful guidance on what does and does not constitute “good
cause” emerges from the decisions I have canvassed. It is not
enough for counsel to claim that s/he is too busy to meet the
deadline, has plans to be on vacation, wants more time to
study the record, or was only recently added to the client’s
team of lawyers. Such assertions, inasmuch as they turn on
factors within the control of counsel or the client, can be
raised in most any case and generally do not justify extending
the deadline for certiorari review. Rather, unforeseen or
uncontrollable events (e.g., a death in the family, illness, or
active engagement at trial) lie at the heart of the “good cause”
requirement for additional time to seek certiorari.
I am satisfied that requiring such a showing, albeit a
standard suggested by only a handful of cases on the
application of Rule 13(5), is consistent with the purpose
served by LAR 112.4(a). Our sixty-day period in which to
file a certiorari petition (like the ninety-day period in the
Supreme Court, see Sup. Ct. R. 13(1)), affords an ample
amount of time to prepare and file a petition in accordance
with our local rules.
See LAR 112.6 (setting forth
requirements for the contents of a certiorari petition). This
deadline is sufficiently generous that it ought not to be
17

extended as a routine matter, merely for the convenience of
counsel or the petitioner. The filing of a certiorari petition
commences a new proceeding between the parties, much like
the filing of a notice of appeal. And just as extensions of the
time to appeal are limited and exceptional, see Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(5)(A) and 26(b)(1), so too should be extensions of the
time to seek certiorari review. The interest in finality and
desire to avoid needless delay that underlie our rules and
procedures are best served by strict adherence to the sixty-day
deadline, absent some unusual circumstance.
I consider this approach consistent with the
requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a)(5)(A), which provides that
[t]he district court may extend the time to file a
notice of appeal if:
(i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after
the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires;
and
(ii) regardless of whether its motion is filed
before or during the 30 days after the time
prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires, that party
shows excusable neglect or good cause.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A). The Committee Note to the rule
highlights the difference between the excusable neglect and
good cause standards, and explains the showing required for
“good cause” to extend the time to file a notice of appeal:
The good cause and excusable neglect standards
18

have “different domains.”
Lorenzen v.
Employees Retirement Plan, 896 F.2d 228, 232
(7th Cir. 1990). They are not interchangeable,
and one is not inclusive of the other. The
excusable neglect standard applies in situations
in which there is fault; in such situations, the
need for an extension is usually occasioned by
something within the control of the movant.
The good cause standard applies in situations
in which there is no fault—excusable or
otherwise. In such situations, the need for an
extension is usually occasioned by something
that is not within the control of the movant.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii) (2002 Committee Note,
Changes Made After Publication and Comments) (emphasis
added).
A petition for a writ of certiorari is, for purposes of the
present discussion, the functional equivalent of a notice of
appeal: it initiates an appellate proceeding in this Court in the
form of a request for discretionary review.9 While a denial of
9

Because a petition for a writ certiorari is the functional
equivalent of a notice of appeal, Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 26(b) does not inform my analysis of good cause
for extending the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari
under LAR 112.4(a). The plain text of Rule 26(b), which
permits a court of appeals to extend the time prescribed by the
Appellate Rules “to perform any act, or may permit an act to
be done after that time expires,” explicitly states that it may
not extend the time to file a notice of appeal, a petition for
19

certiorari review would end the matter, and thus the life of the
proceeding potentially could be short, it is a new appellate
proceeding nonetheless. The good cause showing needed to
support a request for more time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(5) –
“something that is not within the control of the movant” – fits
the purpose of LAR 112.4(a), as well.
Any lesser
requirement, such as granting an extension based on a mere
showing of no prejudice to the non-moving party, would be
inconsistent with the goal of affording more time only as a
limited exception to the deadline for commencing a certiorari
proceeding.
B.
In light of the foregoing, I conclude that a petitioner
seeking an extension under LAR 112.4(a) must demonstrate a
need for more time based on an event or cause beyond the
control of counsel or the petitioner. This standard will help
direct petitioners toward strict compliance with the sixty-day
period for seeking review and ensure that extensions of the
deadline remain the exception and not the rule.
HOVIC has not demonstrated good cause under this
standard. HOVIC notes that it recently retained an additional
lawyer for this proceeding, and counsel contends that he
needs more time to prepare the certiorari petition. HOVIC
fails, however, to point to any event beyond its control as
having affected its ability to comply with the sixty-day
deadline. HOVIC itself chose to hire an additional lawyer as
permission to appeal, a petition for review. Fed. R. App. P.
26(b)((1)-(2).
20

the deadline approached, and “the addition of another counsel
hardly affords ground for the desired extension.” Carter, 75
S. Ct. at 911. Further, the primary issue on which HOVIC
intends to seek review – essentially, whether the appeal
before the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands became moot
when the parties agreed to settle – would not appear to require
much study of the record by HOVIC’s newly retained
appellate counsel.
While appellate counsel contends that he had other
obligations during the week when the certiorari petition was
due, he does not claim to have been unaware of those
obligations well in advance, nor does it appear that he is so
encumbered by them that requiring compliance with the
deadline would be unreasonable. A busy schedule, by itself,
is not good cause for more time. See Turner, 498 U.S. at
1306. HOVIC also fails to explain (i) why its counsel based
in St. Croix could not prepare, or at least take the lead in
preparing, the certiorari petition, (ii) why another attorney
from appellate counsel’s office could not do so, or (iii) “why
the task has been left to the last minute.” Madden, 498 U.S.
at 1304.
Finally, I note that the putative respondent, Mr.
Joseph, has not opposed the application for an extension of
time. Assuming, arguendo, an absence of prejudice to Mr.
Joseph, that factor would seem to weigh in HOVIC’s favor.
It is not, however, sufficient by itself to support granting the
requested extension. In any event, I am unable to infer with
certainty an absence of prejudice. As stated, there is a
jurisdictional question as to whether the Supreme Court’s
decision is final and reviewable at this time. To the extent
21

that HOVIC’s filing of a certiorari petition will commence a
proceeding that ultimately will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, the filing may only delay further proceedings in
the Superior Court, or delay consummation of the parties’
purported settlement. As such, any extension of time for
certiorari review could run counter to Mr. Joseph’s interests.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that HOVIC has
not made a showing of good cause under LAR 112.4(a).
Nevertheless, I will grant HOVIC’s application for a thirtyday extension of time in light of the absence of prior guidance
from this Court on the showing required. See Madden, 498
U.S. at 1305. I do not find it unreasonable for HOVIC to
have believed that its grounds for seeking additional time
would suffice under the heretofore unexplained good cause
standard of LAR 112.4(a). HOVIC’s right to seek certiorari
review should not be prejudiced under the circumstances.
Accordingly, the Clerk is hereby directed to docket HOVIC’s
petition for a writ of certiorari, with a filing date of June 8,
2011. Respondent, if he so chooses, may file a brief in
opposition to the certiorari petition within thirty days of the
date of this decision. See LAR 112.8.
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